The ransomware landscape continues to evolve, with new threats emerging and existing ones adapting their tactics. Among the significant players is AvosLocker, a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) operation that has gained notoriety for its attacks against critical infrastructure sectors and its adoption of sophisticated techniques. First observed in mid-2021, AvosLocker quickly established itself by employing double extortion tactics—encrypting victim data and threatening to leak stolen sensitive information if the ransom demand is not met.
Operating under a RaaS model, AvosLocker provides its malware and infrastructure to affiliates, who then carry out attacks. This model leads to a diverse range of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) observed in the wild, making detection and defense more challenging. AvosLocker has demonstrated its capability to target multiple operating systems, including Windows, Linux, and VMware ESXi environments, significantly broadening its potential victim pool. This article provides a deep dive into AvosLocker, examining its origins, operational methods, target profile, and effective defense strategies to help security professionals combat this persistent threat. Incident response plan will help to mitigate such attacks effectively.
AvosLocker ransomware surfaced around June-July 2021, potentially seeking to fill the operational vacuum left by the temporary disruption or decline of other major ransomware groups like REvil/Sodinokibi. Its emergence coincided with a period of flux in the cybercrime ecosystem. From the outset, AvosLocker adopted the prevalent RaaS model, recruiting affiliates through advertisements on dark web forums to conduct attacks using its platform. Learn more about the dark web here.
The group quickly gained attention from cybersecurity researchers and law enforcement. The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued joint advisories regarding AvosLocker, first in March 2022 and subsequently updated in May 2023. These advisories highlighted the group's targeting of critical infrastructure sectors within the United States and other countries, underscoring the threat's severity.
AvosLocker has demonstrated consistent evolution:
Platform Expansion: Initially focusing on Windows environments, AvosLocker expanded its capabilities around October 2021 by developing and advertising a Linux variant specifically designed to target VMware ESXi servers. This move significantly increased its threat potential against virtualized enterprise environments.
Tactical Refinements: Early versions relied heavily on known initial access vectors. Over time, affiliates began incorporating more sophisticated techniques, including the exploitation of specific vulnerabilities (like those in Microsoft Exchange) and the abuse of legitimate remote administration tools.
Evasion Techniques: The introduction of techniques like booting victim systems into Safe Mode before encryption (a tactic also used by REvil) was observed in later versions. This method helps bypass security software that may not operate effectively in Safe Mode.
Infrastructure Development: AvosLocker operates a dedicated leak site on the Tor network where they name non-compliant victims and threaten to publish or auction stolen data, adding pressure to the double extortion scheme.
While direct attribution to a specific country or state-sponsored group remains unconfirmed, AvosLocker operates primarily for financial gain, typical of many RaaS operations. The continuous updates to CISA advisories, including new Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) and TTPs, indicate that AvosLocker is an active, adapting, and persistent threat in the ransomware landscape. What is threat intelligence and why it is important for every organization.
AvosLocker affiliates employ a multi-stage attack lifecycle, often leveraging legitimate tools and open-source software to blend in with normal network activity and evade detection. Their TTPs reflect a pragmatic approach focused on efficiency and bypassing security controls.
Initial Access:
Exploiting Vulnerabilities: Affiliates actively scan for and exploit known vulnerabilities in public-facing applications. Notable examples include vulnerabilities in Microsoft Exchange servers (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) and Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (CVE-2021-40539).
Compromised Credentials: Purchase and use of compromised Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) or Virtual Private Network (VPN) credentials obtained from initial access brokers or dark web markets.
Phishing: Deployment of spear-phishing campaigns targeting employees with malicious attachments or links. Learn more about types of phishing attacks.
Abuse of Remote Access Tools: Leveraging legitimate remote administration tools like AnyDesk, Splashtop Streamer, Tactical RMM, PuTTy, Atera Agent, and PDQ Deploy as backdoors for initial and persistent access. AnyDesk has been observed being configured to run even in Safe Mode.
Execution and Persistence:
Command and Scripting: Extensive use of PowerShell and Windows Command Shell (Batch scripts like Love.bat
, lock.bat
, update.bat
). Custom scripts (e.g., AVO.ps1
) are used for privilege escalation, lateral movement, disabling security tools, and automating tasks.
Legitimate Tool Abuse: Utilizing built-in Windows tools like PsExec
and nltest
for remote command execution and network reconnaissance. Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is also employed for execution.
C2 Frameworks: Deployment of common command-and-control frameworks like Cobalt Strike and Sliver to maintain control over compromised systems.
Webshells: Uploading custom webshells onto compromised web servers to ensure persistent network access.
Privilege Escalation and Defense Evasion:
Credential Dumping: Using tools like Mimikatz and LaZagne to harvest credentials from memory and password stores.
Disabling Security Software: Custom scripts are often used to terminate processes associated with antivirus and endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions.
Safe Mode Execution: A notable technique involves rebooting endpoints into Safe Mode with Networking before initiating encryption. This often bypasss or disables security products. Specific drivers might be disabled to ensure tools like AnyDesk function correctly in this mode.
Deleting Shadow Copies: Using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
and wmic.exe shadowcopy delete
commands to remove volume shadow copies, hindering file recovery.
Clearing Logs: Employing PowerShell commands to clear Windows Event Logs to cover tracks.
Disabling Recovery Mode: Using bcdedit /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
and bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no
to disable Windows automatic recovery features.
Lateral Movement:
Utilizing tools like PsExec and compromised credentials to move across the network.
Scanning the network for accessible shares and systems using native tools or scanners like RDP Scanner.
Command and Control (C2):
Protocol Tunneling: Employing tools like Ligolo and Chisel to create encrypted tunnels for C2 communication, often over standard ports like 443, to bypass network egress filtering.
Custom Proxies: Use of tools like NetMonitor.exe
, a reverse proxy disguised as a legitimate tool, for encrypted C2 traffic.
Exfiltration:
Data Theft: Prioritizing the exfiltration of sensitive data before deploying the ransomware payload (double extortion).
Exfiltration Tools: Using legitimate tools like FileZilla and Rclone, or custom scripts, to transfer stolen data to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Impact (Encryption):
Encryption Algorithm: Typically uses a hybrid approach, encrypting files with AES-256 and protecting the AES key with RSA encryption. Learn about symmetric and asymmetric encryption.
Targeted Files: Encrypts files based on extensions, excluding critical system files to keep the OS operational for ransom payment.
File Extensions: Appends extensions like .avos
, .avos2
, or .avoslinux
to encrypted files.
Ransom Note: Drops a ransom note (e.g., GET_YOUR_FILES_BACK.txt
) in directories containing encrypted files, directing victims to a Tor-based site for payment instructions and negotiation. Victims may sometimes receive phone calls from the attackers.
Multi-threading: Employs multiple threads during encryption for faster impact.
MITRE ATT&CK TTPs Observed:
The following table maps observed AvosLocker activities to the MITRE ATT&CK framework based on CISA reporting:
Tactic
|
Technique ID
|
Technique Name
|
---|---|---|
Initial Access
|
T1133
|
External Remote Services
|
Initial Access
|
T1189
|
Drive-by Compromise
|
Initial Access
|
T1566
|
Phishing
|
Initial Access
|
T1078
|
Valid Accounts
|
Execution
|
T1059.001
|
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
|
Execution
|
T1059.003
|
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
|
Execution
|
T1047
|
Windows Management Instrumentation
|
Execution
|
T1204.002
|
User Execution: Malicious File
|
Persistence
|
T1505.003
|
Server Software Component: Web Shell
|
Persistence
|
T1053.005
|
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
|
Persistence
|
T1547.001
|
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
|
Privilege Escalation
|
T1078
|
Valid Accounts
|
Defense Evasion
|
T1070.004
|
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
|
Defense Evasion
|
T1562.001
|
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
|
Defense Evasion
|
T1562.009
|
Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot
|
Defense Evasion
|
T1036.004
|
Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service
|
Defense Evasion
|
T1055.001
|
Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
|
Credential Access
|
T1555
|
Credentials from Password Stores
|
Credential Access
|
T1003
|
OS Credential Dumping (e.g., Mimikatz)
|
Discovery
|
T1082
|
System Information Discovery
|
Discovery
|
T1016
|
System Network Configuration Discovery
|
Discovery
|
T1033
|
System Owner/User Discovery
|
Discovery
|
T1083
|
File and Directory Discovery
|
Discovery
|
T1135
|
Network Share Discovery
|
Lateral Movement
|
T1021.001
|
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
|
Lateral Movement
|
T1570
|
Lateral Tool Transfer
|
Lateral Movement
|
T1021.002
|
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares (e.g., PsExec)
|
Command and Control
|
T1071.001
|
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
|
Command and Control
|
T1572
|
Protocol Tunneling
|
Command and Control
|
T1105
|
Ingress Tool Transfer
|
Exfiltration
|
T1041
|
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
|
Exfiltration
|
T1567.002
|
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
|
Impact
|
T1486
|
Data Encrypted for Impact
|
Impact
|
T1490
|
Inhibit System Recovery (Shadow Copy Deletion)
|
AvosLocker's targeting strategy appears primarily driven by financial motives, typical of RaaS operations. Affiliates often perform reconnaissance to identify organizations perceived as having the capacity and willingness to pay substantial ransoms.
Target Industries: AvosLocker has demonstrated a broad targeting scope, but shows a notable focus on:
Critical Infrastructure Sectors (as highlighted by FBI/CISA)
Financial Services
Critical Manufacturing
Government Facilities (Local, State)
Healthcare and Public Health
Education
IT Providers (potential supply chain impact)
Automotive and Trucking
Hospitality and Retail
Energy
Geographic Focus: While attacks are global, there has been a significant concentration of victims in the United States. Other heavily impacted regions include Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, and various European and Asian countries.
Organizational Size: Victims range from Small and Medium-sized Businesses (SMBs) to large enterprises, indicating flexibility in affiliate targeting based on opportunity.
Potential Impact: Beyond the immediate financial cost of ransom payments (if made), victims face severe consequences including:
Operational Disruption: System downtime affecting business continuity.
Data Breach: Exposure of sensitive corporate, employee, or customer data due to pre-encryption theft.
Reputational Damage: Loss of trust from customers and partners.
Recovery Costs: Significant expenses related to incident response, system restoration, and security improvements.
The focus on critical infrastructure and essential services underscores the potential for AvosLocker attacks to have wide-ranging societal impacts beyond the immediate victim organization. Learn more about the cybersecurity risks.
While specific large-scale, named campaigns attributed solely to AvosLocker are less documented than those of groups like Conti or LockBit, the collective activity of its affiliates constitutes an ongoing and significant threat. Key aspects of their campaigns include:
Consistent Targeting of Critical Infrastructure: As emphasized in the FBI/CISA advisories from March 2022 and the update in May 2023, AvosLocker affiliates persistently target critical sectors in the US and allied nations. This indicates a strategic focus, likely based on the perceived higher likelihood of payment due to the critical nature of operations.
Exploitation of Specific Vulnerabilities: Campaigns have been observed capitalizing on widespread vulnerabilities shortly after their disclosure, such as the ProxyShell/ProxyLogon flaws in Microsoft Exchange and the Zoho ManageEngine vulnerability. This opportunistic approach allows them to compromise numerous organizations quickly.
Use of Legitimate Tools for Evasion: A hallmark of AvosLocker campaigns is the heavy reliance on legitimate administrative tools (AnyDesk, PDQ Deploy, PuTTy) and built-in OS utilities (PsExec, PowerShell, WMI). This "living-off-the-land" approach makes their activity harder to distinguish from legitimate administrative actions, complicating detection.
Multi-Platform Attacks: The availability of both Windows and Linux/ESXi variants allows affiliates to conduct campaigns targeting diverse enterprise environments, maximizing their potential victim base within a single compromised network or across different organizations.
The FBI/CISA advisories serve as key reference points, summarizing observed TTPs and IOCs from numerous incidents investigated between 2021 and 2023, reflecting the continuous nature of AvosLocker affiliate campaigns rather than distinct, time-bound operations. Microsoft uncovers advanced XCSSET malware targeting macOS users.
Defending against AvosLocker requires a multi-layered security strategy focusing on preventing initial access, detecting malicious activity early, and ensuring rapid recovery. Given their use of legitimate tools and evolving tactics, a defense-in-depth approach is crucial.
Preventing Initial Access:
Patch Management: Prioritize patching of known exploited vulnerabilities, especially on internet-facing systems like VPN gateways, RDP servers, Exchange servers, and other web applications. Subscribe to CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog updates.
Secure Remote Access:
Restrict RDP and other remote access services. Close unused ports.
Enforce strong, unique passwords and Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for all remote access accounts, privileged accounts, and critical systems.
Implement account lockout policies after failed login attempts.
Log and monitor all remote access attempts.
Consider application allowlisting to restrict the use of unauthorized remote administration tools (AnyDesk, Splashtop, etc.). Review CISA's guidance on securing remote access software.
Email Security: Implement robust email filtering to block phishing attempts and malicious attachments. Provide regular security awareness training to employees on identifying phishing tactics. Use email banners to mark external messages.
Credential Security: Enforce NIST-compliant password policies (long passphrases, no reuse). Regularly audit for weak or compromised credentials.
Detection and Response:
Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR): Deploy EDR solutions capable of detecting malicious PowerShell execution, credential dumping (Mimikatz), process injection, and suspicious use of administrative tools like PsExec.
Network Monitoring: Monitor network traffic for unusual patterns, C2 communications (especially tunneling activity via tools like Ligolo/Chisel), and large data exfiltration attempts.
PowerShell Hardening and Logging:
Restrict PowerShell use via Group Policy where possible (e.g., Constrained Language Mode).
Enable enhanced PowerShell logging (Module Logging, Script Block Logging, Transcription) and ensure logs are centrally collected and retained for at least 180 days.
IOC Sweeping: Regularly ingest and scan for IOCs provided by CISA, FBI, and threat intelligence providers. Utilize the provided YARA rule for detecting specific AvosLocker tools like NetMonitor.exe
.rule FBI_AvosLocker_NetMonitor_1 : Actor_AvosLocker{ meta: author = "FBI" description = "Detects NetMonitor malware used by AvosLocker actors" reference = "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-136a" date = "2023-05-16" strings: $s1 = { 61 00 76 00 6f 00 73 00 6c 00 6f 00 63 00 6b 00 65 00 72 00 } /* a.v.o.s.l.o.c.k.e.r. */ $s2 = { 53 79 73 74 65 6d 2e 4e 65 74 2e 53 6f 63 6b 65 74 73 } /* System.Net.Sockets */ $s3 = { 54 63 70 43 6c 69 65 6e 74 } /* TcpClient */ $s4 = { 4e 65 74 77 6f 72 6b 53 74 72 65 61 6d } /* NetworkStream */ $s5 = { 43 72 79 70 74 6f 67 72 61 70 68 79 } /* Cryptography */ $s6 = { 41 45 53 43 72 79 70 74 6f 50 72 6f 76 69 64 65 72 } /* AESCryptoProvider */ $s7 = { 43 72 79 70 74 6f 53 74 72 65 61 6d } /* CryptoStream */ condition: all of them}
System Hardening:
Configure Windows Registry to require User Account Control (UAC) approval for PsExec execution from a non-elevated process. What is Windows Sysinternals and how to get the Sysinternals Suite.
Disable File and Printer Sharing services if not essential, or secure them with strong passwords/Access Control Lists (ACLs).
Recovery and Resilience:
Backup Strategy: Implement the 3-2-1 backup rule (three copies, two different media types, one offsite). Ensure backups are immutable, encrypted, stored offline or in a segmented network zone, and tested regularly.
Incident Response Plan: Develop and regularly test an incident response plan that specifically addresses ransomware scenarios.
Network Segmentation: Segment networks to limit the blast radius if an infection occurs. Prevent lateral movement between critical segments.
Secure-by-Design: Encourage software vendors to adopt Secure-by-Design and Secure-by-Default principles to minimize the attack surface presented by their products.
Organizations should continuously validate their security controls against the known TTPs of AvosLocker and other prevalent ransomware threats. Reporting incidents to CISA (via CISA.gov/report) or the FBI (via IC3.gov) is crucial, even if no ransom is paid, to help track the threat and protect others. SIEM solutions can help with security monitoring.
AvosLocker remains a significant and adaptive threat within the RaaS ecosystem. Its targeting of critical infrastructure, expansion to Linux/ESXi platforms, and reliance on legitimate tools for evasion highlight the challenges defenders face. The RaaS model ensures a steady stream of attacks driven by various affiliates, making vigilance and proactive defense paramount. By understanding AvosLocker's TTPs, focusing on robust prevention measures like patching and MFA, implementing comprehensive detection capabilities like enhanced logging and EDR, and maintaining tested offline backups, organizations can significantly improve their resilience against this persistent ransomware family. Continuous monitoring of threat intelligence and adherence to guidance from authorities like CISA and the FBI are essential components of an effective defense strategy.
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Arun KL is a cybersecurity professional with 15+ years of experience in IT infrastructure, cloud security, vulnerability management, Penetration Testing, security operations, and incident response. He is adept at designing and implementing robust security solutions to safeguard systems and data. Arun holds multiple industry certifications including CCNA, CCNA Security, RHCE, CEH, and AWS Security.
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