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March 31, 2025
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REvil


Futuristic cyber-skull with glowing red eyes symbolizing AI-driven cyber threats.

REvil, also known by its ransomware name Sodinokibi, emerged as one of the most notorious and prolific cybercriminal operations in recent history. Operating primarily under a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model, REvil provided its potent ransomware code and infrastructure to affiliates, who then carried out devastating attacks across the globe. Known for its brazen tactics, high ransom demands, and targeting of large enterprises and critical infrastructure, REvil exemplified the escalating threat of financially motivated cybercrime. The group pioneered and popularized the "double extortion" tactic – encrypting victim data while simultaneously exfiltrating sensitive information and threatening to leak it publicly on their dedicated "Happy Blog" leak site if ransom demands were not met. Although officially dismantled by international law enforcement efforts in late 2021 and early 2022, REvil's impact, techniques, and the RaaS model it championed continue to influence the threat landscape, making an understanding of its operations crucial for security professionals.

Origins & Evolution

REvil is widely believed to have emerged in April 2019, shortly after the high-profile shutdown of another major RaaS operation, GandCrab. Significant code similarities between GandCrab and Sodinokibi, along with the timing of REvil's appearance, strongly suggest that REvil was either a direct successor, a rebrand, or operated by core members of the former GandCrab team. The name "REvil" itself is thought to be a contraction of "Ransomware Evil," potentially inspired by the Resident Evil video game series, while "Sodinokibi" was derived from an internal name within the malware code.

The group is strongly suspected to have originated from Russia or Russian-speaking regions. This assessment is based on several factors: the malware code included checks to avoid encrypting systems using Russian or other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) keyboard layouts or language settings; the group predominantly targeted organizations outside the CIS; and ultimately, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) claimed responsibility for dismantling the group's core infrastructure and arresting members in January 2022, following intelligence sharing prompted by pressure from the United States.

REvil rapidly evolved from its inception, quickly gaining notoriety for its effectiveness and the scale of its attacks. The RaaS model allowed it to scale operations significantly, attracting numerous skilled affiliates. Over time, REvil operators refined their malware, improved evasion techniques, and increased their ransom demands substantially, often demanding millions of dollars. The group's infrastructure, including the "Happy Blog," became a central part of their extortion strategy. Despite a temporary disappearance in mid-2021 following the Kaseya attack and subsequent international pressure, the group's infrastructure briefly reappeared before being definitively seized and dismantled by law enforcement efforts known as "Operation GoldDust." Internal conflicts also reportedly plagued the group, including accusations of the core developers cheating affiliates out of ransom payments via a backdoor, which may have contributed to its eventual downfall. An intrusion set tracked as "Water Mare" has been linked to the operators behind REvil, with key figures like "UNKN" (or "Unknown") acting as public faces or recruiters on underground forums before disappearing.

Tactics & Techniques

REvil operated a sophisticated RaaS model, leveraging a network of skilled affiliates to execute attacks while the core team maintained the ransomware code, C2 infrastructure, and the payment/leak portal. Their modus operandi involved multiple stages, showcasing a range of advanced TTPs.

  • Initial Access: Affiliates employed various methods to breach victim networks. Common vectors included:

    • Exploiting Vulnerabilities: Targeting known vulnerabilities in public-facing applications, such as VPN gateways (Pulse Secure CVE-2019-11510, Fortinet CVE-2018-13379, Citrix CVE-2019-19781) and remote management software (Kaseya VSA CVE-2021-30116).

    • Phishing Campaigns: Using spear-phishing emails with malicious attachments (often JavaScript or Office documents with macros) or links leading to exploit kits or credential harvesting pages. Learn more about types of phishing attacks.

    • Compromised RDP: Brute-forcing or using stolen Remote Desktop Protocol credentials to gain direct access to servers.

    • Malware Distribution Networks: Leveraging other malware infections like Qakbot or TrickBot as an entry point.

  • Execution and Persistence: Once initial access was gained, REvil affiliates executed payloads, often using PowerShell or scripting interpreters. Persistence was established through methods like creating scheduled tasks or modifying registry run keys. Later variants introduced the ability to reboot into Safe Mode to bypass security controls during encryption.

  • Defense Evasion: REvil employed numerous techniques to avoid detection:

    • Process Injection: Injecting malicious code into legitimate processes (e.g., specifically targeting Ahnlab's autoup.exe or PowerShell).

    • Disabling Security Tools: Terminating processes associated with antivirus, EDR solutions, and backup software. Windows Defender was often specifically targeted.

    • Deleting Shadow Copies: Using vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet to prevent easy file recovery.

    • Code Obfuscation: Utilizing multiple layers of obfuscation, particularly in initial droppers (e.g., JavaScript obfuscation, Base64 encoding).

    • Language/Region Checks: Avoiding execution on systems configured for Russian or CIS languages.

    • UAC Bypass: Employing techniques to escalate privileges without triggering User Account Control prompts.

  • Discovery and Lateral Movement: Affiliates performed reconnaissance within the network using tools like AdFind, BloodHound, and NBTScan to map the environment, identify high-value targets, and locate domain controllers. Lateral movement was typically achieved using valid credentials (obtained via tools like Mimikatz, often deployed via frameworks like Cobalt Strike or SharpSploit) in conjunction with protocols like RDP and tools like PsExec.

  • Credential Access: Dumping credentials from memory using Mimikatz was a common tactic to facilitate lateral movement and privilege escalation.

  • Exfiltration: Before deploying the ransomware, REvil affiliates exfiltrated large volumes of sensitive data using tools like MegaSync, Rclone, or FileZilla. This data formed the basis of their double extortion threat.

  • Command and Control (C2): Communication with C2 servers often occurred over Tor or via HTTPS, using generated domain lists. Encrypted configuration files dictated C2 details, affiliate IDs (pid), campaign IDs (sub), exclusion lists, and other operational parameters.

  • Impact: The final stage involved encrypting files across the compromised network using strong encryption algorithms (like Salsa20 and elliptic-curve cryptography). A ransom note, typically named [extension]-readme.txt, was dropped in each directory, directing victims to a Tor-based payment portal. The desktop wallpaper was often changed to display a ransom message. Failure to pay resulted in the publication of stolen data on the "Happy Blog." DDoS attacks were sometimes used as an additional pressure tactic. Learn how to protect your online business.

Tools Commonly Associated with REvil Operations: Cobalt Strike, Mimikatz, PsExec, AdFind, BloodHound, SharpSploit, Process Hacker, PC Hunter, Rclone, MegaSync, FileZilla, PowerShell Empire, Qakbot (as delivery).

Targets or Victimology

REvil's primary motivation was financial gain, achieved through large ransom payments and, occasionally, the sale of stolen data. While not explicitly linked to state-sponsored espionage, the group's targeting sometimes overlapped with geopolitical interests, particularly concerning critical infrastructure, though profit remained the driving force.

The potential impact of a REvil attack was severe, including:

  • Data Breach: Exfiltration of sensitive corporate, customer, or employee data.

  • Operational Disruption: Encryption of critical systems leading to complete shutdowns of business operations, manufacturing lines, or essential services.

  • Financial Loss: Costs associated with ransom payments, incident response, recovery efforts, legal fees, and regulatory fines.

  • Reputational Damage: Loss of customer trust and public confidence following data leaks or service outages.

  • Supply Chain Effects: Attacks on managed service providers (MSPs) like Kaseya demonstrated the potential for cascading impacts across hundreds or thousands of downstream organizations.

Targeted Industries: REvil was largely indiscriminate but often focused on organizations perceived as having the capacity and incentive to pay large ransoms. Key sectors included:

  • Information Technology (especially MSPs)

  • Manufacturing & Food Production (e.g., JBS, Acer, Quanta)

  • Legal Services

  • Healthcare

  • Financial Services

  • Transportation & Logistics

  • Retail

  • Local Government and Educational Institutions

Targeted Regions: REvil operated globally but had a significant focus on North America (particularly the United States) and Europe. As noted, they actively avoided targeting organizations within Russia and the CIS. Learn more about cybersecurity in the age of IoT.

Attack Campaigns

REvil was responsible for numerous high-impact ransomware campaigns during its operational period. Some of the most notable include:

  • Grubman Shire Meiselas & Sacks (May 2020): A high-profile attack against a major entertainment law firm representing numerous celebrities. REvil claimed to have stolen 756GB of data and initially demanded $21 million, later doubling it to $42 million and threatening to release data related to prominent clients, including an unsuccessful extortion attempt against then-President Trump.

  • Acer (March 2021): The Taiwanese computer manufacturer was hit with a $50 million ransom demand, one of the largest recorded at the time. REvil affiliates claimed to have exploited Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities to gain access.

  • Quanta Computer (April 2021): An attack on a major Taiwanese electronics manufacturer and key Apple supplier. REvil stole confidential schematics, including designs for upcoming Apple products, and demanded $50 million.

  • JBS S.A. (May 2021): A devastating attack on the world's largest meat processing company, forcing the temporary shutdown of facilities in the US, Canada, and Australia, impacting food supply chains. JBS ultimately paid an $11 million ransom in Bitcoin. The White House publicly attributed the attack to REvil.

  • Kaseya VSA (July 2021): Perhaps REvil's most infamous attack. The group exploited a zero-day vulnerability (CVE-2021-30116) in Kaseya's VSA remote management software, used by MSPs. This supply chain attack allowed REvil to distribute ransomware to potentially thousands of downstream clients globally, causing widespread disruption (e.g., forcing the closure of Coop supermarkets in Sweden). REvil initially demanded $70 million for a universal decryptor. This attack significantly escalated international law enforcement focus on the group.

Defenses

Defending against threats like REvil requires a multi-layered security strategy focusing on prevention, detection, and response. Given REvil's TTPs, the following defenses are particularly relevant:

  1. Patch Management: Aggressively patch vulnerabilities, especially those in public-facing systems like VPNs, RDP, and management software. Prioritize patches for CVEs known to be exploited by REvil and similar groups. Learn more about patch management strategy.

  2. Secure Remote Access: Harden RDP configurations (disable if unused, use strong passwords, MFA, Network Level Authentication), implement MFA for VPN access, and monitor remote access logs closely.

  3. Email Security: Deploy advanced email filtering solutions to block phishing attempts, malicious attachments, and dangerous links. Conduct regular security awareness training for employees on identifying phishing tactics.

  4. Endpoint Security: Utilize robust Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions capable of detecting and blocking REvil's TTPs, such as credential dumping (Mimikatz), process injection, lateral movement tools (PsExec), and ransomware behaviors. Keep signatures and behavioral models up-to-date.

  5. Network Segmentation: Segment networks to limit the blast radius of an infection. Prevent lateral movement by restricting communication between segments based on the principle of least privilege.

  6. Least Privilege: Enforce the principle of least privilege for user accounts and service accounts. Limit administrative privileges strictly to those who require them.

  7. PowerShell Security: Enable enhanced PowerShell logging and consider constraining PowerShell usage where possible using policies like Constrained Language Mode.

  8. Backup and Recovery: Implement a robust backup strategy following the 3-2-1 rule (3 copies, 2 different media, 1 offsite/offline/immutable). Regularly test backup restoration procedures. Ensure backups are protected from ransomware encryption (e.g., offline or immutable storage).

  9. Vulnerability Management: Conduct regular vulnerability scanning and penetration testing to identify and remediate weaknesses before they can be exploited.

  10. Threat Intelligence: Stay informed about active ransomware threats, TTPs, and IOCs through threat intelligence feeds and security reports. You can improve threat detection using SOAR.

  11. Incident Response Plan: Develop and regularly test a comprehensive incident response plan specifically addressing ransomware scenarios, including steps for containment, eradication, recovery, and communication.

REvil / Sodinokibi TTPs (MITRE ATT&CK)

Tactic
Technique ID
Technique Name
NetWalker
Sodinokibi/REvil
Reconnaissance
T1592
Gather Victim Host Information
Affiliates gather info about target systems before deploying
Discovery phase after initial access
Resource Development
T1587.001
Develop Capabilities: Malware
CIRCUS SPIDER developed and maintained the Netwalker payload
Core group developed Sodinokibi ransomware
Initial Access
T1566
Phishing
Used email lures (e.g., COVID-19) with malicious attachments or links
Common vector via malicious emails/links
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
Exploited vulnerabilities in VPNs (Pulse Secure), Web Apps (Telerik UI), Citrix Gateway
Exploiting vulnerabilities like CVE-2019-19781, CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2021-30116
T1078
Valid Accounts
Exploited weak or compromised credentials, especially for RDP
Using stolen or brute-forced RDP/VPN credentials
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
Not documented
Via exploit kits or compromised websites
Execution
T1059.001
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Frequently used PowerShell for downloading payloads and fileless execution
Heavily used for execution, downloading payloads, defense evasion
T1204.002
User Execution: Malicious File
Relied on users opening malicious email attachments (e.g., VBScripts)
User interaction needed for phishing attachments
T1059.007
Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
Not documented
Used in initial droppers via phishing
Persistence
T1547.001
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys
Some variants added registry keys for persistence
Common persistence mechanism
T1053.005
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Potential use of scheduled tasks for persistence or execution
Used for maintaining persistence
Privilege Escalation
T1078
Valid Accounts
Used compromised privileged accounts for broader access
See Initial Access
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
Not documented
Used vulnerabilities like CVE-2018-8453
T1548.002
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass UAC
Not documented
Attempted UAC bypass if needed
Defense Evasion
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
Deleted Volume Shadow Copies using vssadmin
Deleting Shadow Copies using vssadmin
T1055/T1055.012
Process Injection/Process Hollowing
Injected code into legitimate processes like explorer.exe
Injecting payload into legitimate processes (e.g., Ahnlab)
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
Embedded configuration was often RC4 encrypted. Used dynamic API resolution
Not explicitly documented
T1562.001
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Attempted to terminate security software processes
Terminating AV/EDR processes
T1070.004
Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
Not documented
Deleting original files after encryption
T1480.001
Execution Guardrails: Environmental Keying
Not documented
Language/region checks to avoid CIS countries
T1497.001
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
Not documented
Basic checks for analysis environments
T1562.009
Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot
Not documented
Later variants used safe mode to bypass defenses during encryption
Credential Access
T1003.001
OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
Not documented
Using Mimikatz to extract credentials
Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
Scanned local drives and network shares for files to encrypt
Identifying files/folders to encrypt/exclude
T1135
Network Share Discovery
Specifically looked for accessible network shares, including Admin$
Finding accessible network shares using tools like AdFind/BloodHound
T1082
System Information Discovery
Gathered basic system info to tailor attack or ransom note
Gathering basic system info for C2
T1057
Process Discovery
Not documented
Identifying security processes to terminate
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
Not documented
Understanding network settings
T1049
System Network Connections Discovery
Not documented
Identifying network shares/connections
Lateral Movement
T1021.001
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Used RDP for moving within the network if credentials were obtained
Moving laterally using compromised credentials via RDP
T1021.002
Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Moved laterally and encrypted files via network shares
Using tools like PsExec with valid credentials
Collection
T1119
Automated Collection
Ransomware automatically collected files for encryption
Ransomware automatically scans and identifies files for encryption
T1560
Archive Collected Data
Data likely staged and archived before exfiltration
Potentially archiving data before exfiltration
Command & Control
T1071.001
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
Used Tor-based web portals for ransom negotiation and data leak site
HTTPS for C2 communication
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
PowerShell used to download ransomware payload. Cobalt Strike beacons used by affiliates
Not explicitly documented
T1573.002
Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography
Not documented
Encrypting C2 communication/configuration data (e.g., RC4, ECC)
T1132.001
Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
Not documented
Base64 encoding used in scripts
T1571
Non-Standard Port
Not documented
Possibly used non-standard ports
T1090.003
Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
Not documented
Use of Tor for C2 and payment portal
Exfiltration
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Likely exfiltrated data over standard protocols (HTTPS) or custom channels before encryption
Smaller amounts of system data sent over C2
T1567.002
Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud
Stolen data uploaded to attacker-controlled storage before being posted on leak site
Not explicitly documented
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
Not documented
Using tools like MegaSync, Rclone, FileZilla for bulk data theft
Impact
T1486
Data Encrypted for Impact
Core function: encrypted files using Salsa20 and demanded ransom
Core ransomware function using Salsa20/AES + ECC/RSA
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
Deleting backups/shadow copies increased impact and pressure to pay
Deleting Shadow Copies using vssadmin
T1485
Data Destruction
Deleting shadow copies constitutes a form of data destruction
See Inhibit System Recovery
T1489
Service Stop
Not documented
Stopping services (e.g., database, backup) to ensure file access
T1561.002
Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe
Not documented
Some variants might modify boot sectors or MBR
T1491.001
Defacement: Internal Defacement
Not documented
Changing desktop wallpaper to ransom message

Conclusion

REvil (Sodinokibi) represented a significant escalation in the ransomware threat landscape between 2019 and 2021. Operating as a highly successful RaaS platform, it empowered numerous affiliates to conduct devastating attacks globally, pioneering double extortion tactics and targeting critical infrastructure for massive financial gain. Likely originating from Russia and evolving from the remnants of GandCrab, REvil's campaigns against entities like JBS and Kaseya caused widespread disruption and prompted concerted international law enforcement action, leading to its eventual takedown. While the core REvil operation has been dismantled, its legacy persists through the widespread adoption of the RaaS model and double extortion tactics by other cybercriminal groups. Understanding REvil's origins, TTPs, and impact remains vital for security professionals seeking to defend against the ever-evolving ransomware threat. Learn more about what is the MITRE ATT&CK framework.

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Arun KL

Arun KL is a cybersecurity professional with 15+ years of experience in IT infrastructure, cloud security, vulnerability management, Penetration Testing, security operations, and incident response. He is adept at designing and implementing robust security solutions to safeguard systems and data. Arun holds multiple industry certifications including CCNA, CCNA Security, RHCE, CEH, and AWS Security.

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